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A Low Carbon Industrial Revolution? 
 Policy-makers & academics have argued that a UK low 
carbon transition could/should amount to a ‘low carbon 
industrial revolution’.  
 Two propositions underlie this suggestion. 
– The productivity gains & economic benefits from a low 
carbon transition would resemble those of past revolutions, 
making such a transition economically & environmentally 
desirable (Huehne 2011, Rifkin 2011). 
– The scale of changes in technologies, institutions & 
practices needed to reduce GHG emissions is comparable 
with those of past industrial revolutions or ‘waves’ of 
technological transformation (Stern 2011a, 2011b).  
 
The Attraction of a New Industrial Revolution 
 Especially in today’s context, isn’t hard to understand: 
– Draws on recognition that earlier revolutions saw new 
technologies supplement & displace incumbent, less efficient 
fuels & technologies 
– And led to a growing & sustained stream of productivity 
improvements, other innovations & economic gains 
 This suggests the value of : 
– Examining the factors that stimulated these past advances & 
sustained the improvements they spawned. 
– Exploring the properties of these innovations, to understand 
what low carbon technologies might emulate. 
– Considering relationships between new &  incumbent 
technologies, since they must displace fossil fuelled 
technologies & the institutions & routines that sustain them. 
 
 
Sources 
 We draw on analyses which have examined 
– The 1st industrial revolution in the 18th & 19th Centuries 
(Allen 2009; Wrigley 2009; Crafts 2010) 
– The relations between long-term technological, institutional 
& economic changes (Freeman & Perez 1988; Freeman & 
Louca, 2001; Mokyr 2009) 
– The role of ‘general purpose technologies’ in long-term 
growth (Helpman 1998; Lipsey et al. 1998, 2005). 
 Our thinking also been informed by the literature on socio-
technical transitions (Geels, 2002, 2005; Grin et al., 
2010), though it doesn’t concentrate  on the economic 
aspects that are the main focus here. 
Two key features of the low carbon transition 
1. The market prospects/incentives for low carbon 
technologies differ from those of  the industrial revolution 
– GHG emissions are ‘externalities’ not fully traded/ priced in 
markets: reduction GHGs lacks durable/credible market value. 
– So climate change a societal issue unachievable solely through 
private markets. 
– Implies a bigger role for public policy in ‘managing’ this transition. 
– Raises key questions about the roles & influence of government, 
market & civil society actors. 
2. Low carbon policies strongly influenced by interplay 
between climate, energy security & affordability. 
  These features influence whether/how a low carbon 
transition might/might not resemble an industrial 
revolution. 
 
Britain’s 1st Industrial Revolution 
 This long socio-economic transformation is regarded as 
the 1st instance of modern economic growth 
 We focus on major interpretations by Robert Allen (2009) 
& Joel Mokyr (2009).  Crafts argues that they offer 
analyses that are complementary & significant:  
– “Allen stresses that the new technologies were 
invented in Britain because they were profitable there 
but not elsewhere, while Mokyr sees the 
Enlightenment as highly significant & underestimated 
by previous scholars” (Crafts 2010). 
 Allen (2009): “The success of the British economy was … 
due to long-haired sheep, cheap coal & the imperial 
foreign policy that secured a rising volume of trade.” 
 
 
 The Industrial Revolution: C16th-C19th Energy 
Transition  
 From a traditional agricultural ‘organic’ economy, with limited 
– Productivity of land & current technologies 
– To supply food, clothing, housing & energy 
 To a new regime: growth/ welfare transformed by exploiting 
– A fossil stock (coal) for larger energy flows (Wrigley) 
 With innovations including 
» The steam engine 
» Cotton mills & new spinning & weaving technologies 
» Substitution of coal/coke for wood/charcoal in metal 
manufacture 
» & other major social, cultural, political & institutional changes  
 That helped drive the 1st ‘Industrial Revolution’ 
 
Why was the Industrial Revolution British? Allen (2009):  
 Late C16-C18 British trade success (wool textiles) => 
–  rural industrialisation & urban growth 
 E.g. London’s growth (1500-1800: 15,000 - 1 million people) => 
– woodfuel shortage eased by exploiting relatively cheaper coal 
(coal & ports gave Britain cheap energy) 
 Responsive agriculture raised food supply & labour productivity 
to feed the towns => 
– freeing labour for manufacturing 
 City & manufacturing growth => 
–  higher wages  & living standards (inc. diet: beef, beer & 
bread) 
 Trade success also created UK’s high wage economy 
 High wages & cheap energy (coal) => 
–  demand for technology to substitute capital &                
energy for labour 
Allen (2009), cont. 
 Led to supply of technologies that substituted capital & energy for 
labour, raising output per worker => 
– Newcomen steam engines used more capital & coal to do this 
– Cotton mills used machines to do it  
– New iron-making technologies substituted cheap coal for expensive 
charcoal; & mechanisation raised output/ worker 
 Growth of R & D, an important C18 business practice, supported 
by venture capital & use of patents to recoup development costs 
 Engineering challenges of these (inefficient) ‘macro-inventions’ 
required ‘micro-inventions’  
 The high wage economy => 
– Led to rising demand for literacy & numeracy skills &  gave parents 
income to purchase them 
– Supplied Britain with skills for the ‘high-tech’ revolution 
 The innovations tailored to British conditions: for years were not 
profitable in countries with lower wages & costlier energy 
Mokyr’s Interpretation 
 He sees the IR as the set of events that made technology 
‘the main engine of economic change’ 
– Britain led the IR because it was uniquely able to exploit its 
“endowment of human & physical resources thanks to the 
great synergy of the Enlightenment: the combination of the 
Baconian program in useful knowledge & the recognition that 
better institutions created better incentives” (Mokyr 2009). 
– What was needed to generate an industrial revolution was the 
right combination of useful knowledge generated by scientists, 
engineers & inventors to be exploited by a supply of skilled 
craftsmen in an institutional environment that produced the 
correct incentives for entrepreneurs. 
 The ideology of the Enlightenment improved both technological 
capabilities & institutional quality – a supply-side argument.   
 
A Combined Hypothesis? 
 Allen & Mokyr’s ideas not mutually exclusive? 
– A combination of both claims “might produce the hypothesis that 
this resulted from the responsiveness of agents, which was 
augmented by the Enlightenment, to the wage & price 
configuration that underpinned the profitability of innovative effort 
in the eighteenth century” (Crafts 2010). 
 These analyses, & others, show that a complex blend of 
economic, cultural, institutional & technological factors 
preceded, catalysed & sustained the1st IR.  
 Though not a ‘managed’ transition in the modern sense,  
& about much more than energy, it was also shaped by 
the choices & agency of a range of actors & institutions 
 
Long-term technological change & economic growth 
 A parallel literature also argues that technological 
innovations that stimulate wider opportunities, like those 
of the IR, have been a key source of economic growth: 
– One strand argues that radical technological change 
has led to ‘long waves’ of economic development 
– while the second strand focuses on the economic 
consequences of ‘general purpose technologies’. 
 General purpose technologies (GPTs) have been defined 
as “a single generic technology […] that initially has much 
scope for improvement & eventually comes to be widely 
used, to have many uses, & to have many spillover 
effects” (Lipsey et al. 2005) 
 
 
General purpose technologies: 3 Properties 
 Three core properties: 
– Technological Dynamism: capacity for continued innovation, 
so costs fall & quality rises. 
– Pervasiveness: a wide range of general applications. 
– Innovational Complementarities: GPT users improve their 
own technologies & find new uses for the GPT. 
 Steam engines, electrification, ICE & ICT cited as examples 
from earleir industrial revolutions. 
 Widespread diffusion of the GPT & linked technologies 
enables further innovative activities leading to mutually 
reinforcing productivity gains over long time periods. 
 The idea of a GPT helps explain why the technological 
progress of the 1st IR continued rather than petering out, as 
previously (Broadberry 2007). 
 
General purpose technologies & time 
 GPT & time lags 
– GPTs have raised productivity growth - but took decades 
– Since a GPT’s penetration involves a long ‘acclimatisation’ 
– While other technologies, forms of organisation, institutions & 
consumption patterns adapt to & gain from the GPT 
– E.g. steam: hard to find productivity fx. until after 1850 (Crafts, 
2004) 
 As noted by evolutionary economists: Freeman & Perez 
(1988) - widespread deployment of radical new 
technologies leads to structural crises of adjustment.  
 Identified 5 ‘long waves’, where growth driven by 
development & application of new technologies/ 
processes but full economic benefits only realised after 
wider institutions & practices had time to adapt. 
 
Low carbon technologies as GPTs? (i) 
 Implications for the idea of a fourth & low carbon industrial 
revolution or sixth ‘long wave’ of low carbon growth  
– For a low carbon transition to become a successful industrial 
revolution, key technologies should be able to stimulate & sustain 
long-term delivery of  big, wider productivity gains & other 
benefits. 
– Means more than just substituting a few low carbon technologies 
into existing uses & institutional structures.  
– For wider economic benefits. low carbon technologies would need 
to be more like GPTs, i.e. with the capacity to be widely diffused & 
used; for continuous innovation & cost reduction; & to stimulate 
innovation in a wide range of complementary technologies.  
 It is not clear that the set of available low carbon 
technologies yet possess these properties. 
 
Low carbon technologies as GPTs? (ii) 
 The 5th ‘long wave’ is based around ICTs. Significant 
productivity improvements have been made in ICT 
production & use, as firms reorganised production & 
supply systems to take advantages of their potential. 
 Suggests ta major opportunity for realising economic 
benefits from low carbon technologies may lie in the 
integration of these technologies with ICTs in so-called 
‘smart’ systems & controls (Pudjianto et al. 2012). 
 We suggest, however, that if they are to develop the 
properties of GPTs, then truly ‘smart’ developments in low 
carbon energy & ICT will need to go well beyond clever 
management of current assets, technologies & practices.  
 
New low carbon technologies & practices? 
 Lesson from previous GPTs is not to be too narrowly 
focused on existing energy & energy-related services 
when envisaging future low carbon technologies.  
 New low carbon ‘technologies’ could look very different 
from those we know - & might be developed/ provided by 
entities different from today’s big incumbents. 
 Will incumbents have the flexibility to move into these 
markets or be locked into established technical 
foundations, habits & institutions? 
 Will established regulatory systems & standards constrain 
or stimulate such progress? 
 
Displacing Incumbents 
 Low carbon technologies must compete with & displace 
incumbent fossil fuels , technologies & institutions.   
 People & markets demand valued ‘bundles’ of socio-
technical ‘characteristics’ (Lancaster, 1966). 
  Low carbon technologies have the socially desirable but 
not fully priced characteristic of low emissions, 
  But as yet, except in niches, tend to lack bundles with 
superior private market value to entrenched fossil fuels  
 Challenge  
– Can they, with appropriate support, offer a superior combination 
of characteristics with market value? 
– & show capacity to kick-off growing stream of innovations/gains? 
Incumbents’ Responses: the Sailing Ship Effect 
 Where existing technologies are mature & under 
pressure, low carbon technologies fight moving targets. 
 E.g., recent developments in performances of petrol & 
diesel engines,  make it harder for electric, H2 & fuel cell 
powered vehicles to penetrate. 
 Tendency for improvements in incumbents to be 
stimulated by new competition, known as ‘sailing ship 
effect ‘ (Geels 2002)/ ‘last gasp effect’  of obsolescent 
technologies 
 Also suggests incumbents have incentives to frustrate 
institutional changes. 
 E.g. German utilities lobbied for repeal of renewables FiT 
 
 
 
Discussion (i) 
 The industrial revolution & long wave literatures show 
how new technologies with GPT characteristics yielded  
enduring productivity gains & wider economic benefits. 
 For the low carbon transition to resemble an industrial 
revolution & its long-run gains, its technologies would 
need ultimately to have properties like these. 
 Some low carbon technologies may have the potential for 
these properties to emerge & hence to give rise to a new 
wave of dynamic, innovative & creative activity, as Stern 
(2011b) suggests. 
 But as yet, unlike many previous GPTs, they tend not to 
offer significant private benefits to technology developers 
or users, beyond the social benefit of lower carbon. 
 
Discussion (ii): more analysis needed! 
 More sophisticated analysis needed to better understand 
the implications of a distinctively low carbon transition. 
 It ‘s not enough just to invoke vague comparisons with 
past industrial revolutions.   
 After all, the first & second revolutions were high carbon 
revolutions. 
 Their success was built on the exploitation, largely un-
constrained by environmental concerns, of fossil fuel 
stocks, freeing the economy from constraints it faced.  
 Suggests there is value in developing a richer 
understanding of how a low carbon transition in today’s 
world presents different challenges & opportunities from 
those involved in previous high carbon revolutions. 
 
Finally 
 The paper informs the challenges of promoting a low carbon 
transition aimed at delivering economic & wider benefits like 
those of previous industrial revolutions. 
 But the larger benefits of previous IRs took decades, while 
climate science posits the urgency of large-scale, rapid GHG 
mitigation. 
 Literature on IRs & long waves shows they involved profound, 
long drawn-out, interacting changes, not just in technology but 
also in markets, institutions, culture & society, much of whose 
complexity we’ve barely touched on. 
 For the low carbon transition to really ‘work’, it may prove 
necessary to transform our energy & related systems in more 
profound - & revolutionary - ways than we have yet realised & 
acknowledged. 
 
 
Thank You! 
 
 
